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I Introduction 
 
In 1990, the power generation industry, the Dutch ministry of Environment, and the provinces 
signed a covenant on the reduction of sulphurdioxide and nitrogenoxides emissions by the power 
generation industry. Emissions of sulphurdioxide (SO2) and nitrogenoxides (NOx) are a major 
cause of acidification, a problem that has negative effects on nature and materials such as 
buildings. In the Netherlands, acidification has resulted in a significant degradation of the woods.  
The Dutch government therefore formulated an acidification policy which has been part of the 
national environmental policy plans since 1989. The targets include maximum levels of emissions 
of SO2 and NOx and NH3 (ammonia) for the relevant sectors. Also for the power generation 
industry, targets have been formulated in order to reduce the emissions of SO2 and NOx. Policy 
instruments used include regulation and the covenant. This covenant is the focus of this paper.   
 
The period covered by the covenant is 1990 till 2000. Even before the end of this period it is clear 
that the targets - the formulated emission reductions of SO2 and NOx - have been realised by the 
sector. The covenant is a success. In the context of the NEAPOL project (Negotiated 
Environmental Agreements: Policy Lessons to be Learned from a Comparative Case Study) this 
paper aims to explain the success of the covenant from the specific characteristics of the 
covenant and the characteristic of the economic-institutional context where in the covenant was 
negotiated and implemented.  
 
Part II of the report describes the setting in which the covenant was agreed and implemented: 
section 1 describes the development of the covenant as an instrument in Dutch environmental 
policy. Section 2 gives a general overview of the problem of acidification; section 3 describes the 
specifics of the power generation industry and the developments of this sector over the years; 
sections 4 and 5 give an overview of the acidification policy of the Dutch government and the 
European authorities.  
Part III of this paper describes the process leading to signing the covenant (section 6); its content 
(section 7) and the results (section 8). 
The case is analysed in part IV: the results of the covenant are analysed in terms of the four 
criteria of performance - feasibility, applicability, effectiveness and efficiency, and resource 
development (section 9).  Section 10 explains the performance of the covenant by making use of 
four hypotheses that each explain the performance of the covenant from a different factor. 
Finally, concluding remarks are given in part V. 
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II The Case Context 
 
 
1. Covenants as policy instrument in Dutch environmental policy   
 
 
In the Netherlands more than 100 covenants have been signed between the Dutch government 
and private actors.  Over the years, the covenant has become a well known and widely used 
instrument in Dutch environmental policy. Based on experiences with the instrument, it has been 
further developed. To understand the setting in which the covenant concerning the reduction of 
SO2 and NOx was negotiated and signed, this section will shortly describe the history of 
covenants as part of Dutch environmental policy.  
 
History of Covenants 
Three phases can be distinguished in the development of covenants in the Netherlands 
(Glasbergen, 1998, p. 133-156).  The first environmental covenants were introduced in the 
second half of the 1980s. These initial covenants concerned only one issue; were closed 
between the ministry of Environment and one actor (a company or branch organisation) and had 
mostly a symbolic function. In fact, these covenants were also called ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ 
since their legal status - enforceability - was not clear.   
 
The discussions on the legal status of the covenant as a policy instrument dominated the second 
phase. The question was how a covenant being a contract under civil law relates to regulations 
under public law (environmental legislation). Sofar, the permit had been the central instrument in 
Dutch environmental policy: it is forbidden to perform any environmentally damaging activities 
without having a permit. Responsibility for the permit system lies with the local and regional 
authorities. These government bodies are supposed to translate the national environmental aims 
into permits for individual companies. The permit giving procedure has been determined in law 
and involves fixed elements, for example the possibility for third parties to object and appeal 
against the permit. There is no such standard procedure for covenants. Especially the 
environmental movement was concerned about deals made between the government and 
industry because they were not able to influence this process. Several court cases took place in 
these years. The outcome of these cases was basically that a covenant is a voluntary agreement 
that cannot contradict the system of public law: it is possible to use a covenant to anticipate upon 
regulations that have not yet been formulated. And it is also possible to use a covenant to 
supplement existing regulation. But a covenant can never replace something that has already 
been established in public law . 
At the same time, the covenant instrument fitted with the idea of ‘internalisation’, the idea that the 
industry has to take its responsibility and deal with the problems. Within this setting, the 
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government closed many covenants among others the covenant concerning the reduction of SO2 
and NOx emissions by the power generation industry (June 1990). Although this covenant is still 
a single issue, single actor covenant also covenants are closed with more complex sectors of 
industry.   
 
Key term of the third phase is the so-called target group policy (Bressers and Klok, 1996, p. 448-
449). Goal of the Dutch government was to achieve a more integral environmental policy. This 
target group policy was officially announced in the first National Environmental Policy Plan 
(NEPP, 1989) and the NEPP-plus (1990). A fundamental principle underlying this approach is 
that the responsibility for reaching the environmental targets lies primarily with the target group 
(Suurland, 1994). In the notes which specified the target group policy, 13 branches of trade were 
selected for the introduction of negotiated agreements. Now the covenants become multiple 
issue involving more actors! The involved branches of trade contain 12,000 companies which 
have more than five employees. Together they are supposed to be responsible for more than 90 
per cent of the industrial environmental burden in the Netherlands (Klok and Kuks, 1994, p. 89). 
These agreements were planned to be concluded by the end of 1992. However, the signing of 
the agreements was delayed, except for three branches of trade. By the end of 1997, nine of the 
selected branches of trade had concluded a negotiated agreement. The delay was merely due to 
factors that appeared during the consultation process. Delay was not caused by complications 
during the implementation, or by changed policy approaches. Reasons for the branches of trade 
to join into the negotiated agreements are first the recognition that the continuation of industrial 
production is at stake in defining the boundaries of sustainable development. Second, the 
influence of the industry would only increase compared to the situation at present. Finally, the 
market increasingly made demands on environmental conditions (Van den Broek and Korten, 
1997). Furthermore, Suurland (1994) recognises the major advantage of the streamlining of 
licensing and enforcement procedures. Besides, he emphasises the advantages of integration of 
sectoral industrial and environmental policies and the integration of environmental and strategic 
company planning. 
 
Legal Status 
The concluded negotiated agreements appear to have many characteristics in common (Van den 
Berg, 1996). First, they share a result obligation regarding the formulation of an Environmental 
Company Plan and an annual report on the progress of the implementation. Besides, they have 
in common the judicial status of the agreement. All can be defined as an agreement in the sense 
of civil law. Third, the agreements share the opportunity for sanctions if companies do not come 
up to the agreement. The target group agreements apply to all company’s in the involved branch 
of trade. If a company fails to implement the agreement, the involved authority is allowed to apply 
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supplementary conditions regarding the company’s permit. Furthermore, the agreements have in 
common that they create a consultation structure. Finally, they share conditions regarding the 
adaptation or termination of the agreement.   
 
The process that generally leads to a target group negotiated agreement is usually characterised 
by signing a declaration of intent on the company level1. A specification of the declaration of 
intent for separate companies is made in the Company Environmental Plan (“bedrijfsmilieuplan”). 
Neither the declaration of intent, nor the Company Environmental Plan replace the environmental 
permit. However, the authority is obliged to take the Company Environmental Plan into account 
during the process of granting a permit. The declarations of intent contain conditions for the 
environmental targets for the branches of trade which belong to the involved target group. The 
overall picture of environmental targets of a certain branch of trade, including the energy 
consumption that according to the authority needs to be realised, is called the Integral 
Environmental Target (“integrale milieutaakstelling”, IMT). Representatives of the involved branch 
of trade and the involved authority together participate in a Consultative Committee that co-
ordinates the implementation of the target group policy for that branch of trade. This Consultative 
Committee reports annually to the Minister of the Environment. All agreements need to be 
officially evaluated once in every four years. Companies which are not part of a negotiated 
agreement are still subject to the old situation. Environmental measures are enforced by permit 
prescriptions. 
 
Since the first use of a covenant by the Dutch government, the instrument has been further 
developed. In 1995 the Dutch Prime Minister presented a document which contained indications 
for negotiated agreements (Staatscourant, 1995:249). The document poses that whenever a 
choice has to be made between regulation or a negotiated agreement, regulation should be 
preferred. However, if more efficacy and effectiveness is expected of a negotiated agreement, 
the option could be considered in four cases. First, in anticipation of regulation, a negotiated 
agreement can meanwhile reach results. Second, if regulation is expected to become 
superfluous in the near future, this can be speed up by a negotiated agreement. Third, a 
negotiated agreement can serve the goal of exploring possible forms of regulation. Finally, a 
negotiated agreement might be able to support regulation.  
 
 
The challenge of environmental policy has shifted from winning corporate co-operation to 
harnessing corporate creativity. Dutch environmental policy is now emphasising consultation 
between government and target groups while encouraging self-regulation among businesses. 
                                                
1 Actually, the agreement itself is usually called “declaration of intent”, even though the agreement is legally binding. 
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Such a policy calls for delicate handling. Because consultation can only succeed if realisation of 
the environmental objectives is ultimately perceived by all participants to be ‘inevitable’, and this 
perception can only be achieved by means of sufficient social and political pressure. In such a 
twin-track policy, therefore, it is vital to achieve an optimal fine-tuning of, on the one hand, 
legislation and enforcement and, on the other, consultation and self-regulation. The only way out 
of this dilemma is to make a differentiation, in terms of both the application and the nature of the 
legal instruments, between positive and active companies, law-abiding but passive companies, 
and uncooperative companies. In other words, legal instruments, which will certainly continue to 
be based on licensing requirements for some time, must be applied more flexibly. Companies 
with an environmental management system -which is recognised by the authorities and, 
preferably, also certified by an external body- can qualify for an integral permit on the basis of 
that system and an approved business environmental plan. In such cases, policy enforcement 
can partly take place through audited progress reports. 
 
 
2. Acidification: the problem 
 
Acidification is the result of atmospheric pollution by (directly or indirectly) acidifying components 
- sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx),and  ammonia (NH3). When there are too much of 
these substances that deposit on the ground or water, negative effects occur. For instance, 
certain kinds of fish are directly affected if the acidity of lakes and streams increases. In soils, 
surplus acidity causes damage to micro-organisms, influences the supply of nutrients and can 
mobilise (toxic) metals such as aluminium. On the longer term, this can have an impact on the 
quality of groundwater stocks and the health of plants and trees. Besides these effects on the 
environment, acidification also degrades materials such as buildings (National Environmental 
Policy Plan 3, 1998).   
 
Acidification is caused by sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and ammonia. The anthropogeneous 
emission of sulphur and nitrogen oxides is strongly related to the burning of fossil fuels. Oil and 
coal contain variable amounts of sulphur that are converted into sulphur dioxide during 
combustion. The emission of sulphur can at considerable cost be reduced by the 
desulphurisation of fuels and flue gases. Natural gas hardly contains sulphur. The most important 
sources of sulphur dioxide are therefore coal- and oilfired power plants, oil refinery and other 
industrial combustion processes.  
Nitrogen oxides are emitted from combustion processes. They are formed by the reaction of 
nitrogen and oxygen in the air under the influence of the heat produced by the burning of any 
kind of fuel. Technological abatement of emissions of nitrogen oxides entails the adaptation of 
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the combustion process itself or the (catalytic) cleaning of fuel gases. The dominant source of 
nitrogen oxide is road traffic. Other major sources are electricity generation and various other 
industries.  
Apart  from a limited amount of industrial process emissions, in the Netherlands agriculture is the 
sole responsible for the emission of ammonia. Particular in areas with high concentrations  of 
intensive lifestock industry (pigs, chicken), stables, manure storage and spreading of manure 
onto the land bring large amounts of ammonia into the air. Technological measures range from 
covering storage tanks to advanced methods of injecting manure into the soil. (Liefferink, 1995, 
p.70). 
  
Typical of the acidification problem is that it is transferred across national borders. In fact, of the 
acidifying emissions in the Netherlands, 66% of the SO2 emissions; 49% of the NH3 and 91% of 
the NOx is transported to our neighbours.  At the same time, we import these substances: 45% of 
the acid deposition in the Netherlands has been imported from abroad (Dougle and Kroon, 1998, 
p. 11).  
 
Research on acidification in the Netherlands therefore often focuses on the emission data of the 
acidifying compounds as well as on the deposition data. Also the Dutch policy takes deposition 
data as the basis for setting an overall target for its acidification policy. The targets for the 
different sectors that contribute to the acidification problem are formulated in emission data (see 
section 3 of this report)  
 
The National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) studies and reports on the 
state of the Dutch environment. The national government is the primary commissioning body for 
these activities. In the environmental balance sheet of 1998 (Milieubalans 1998), the RIVM 
reports on the state of the environment of 1997, in particular in relation to the policy. On the issue 
of acidification the reports states: In the period from 1980 to 1997, the average acid deposition on 
the Netherlands has decreased from 7200 acid equivalents/ha per year to 4000 acid 
equivalents/ha per year (45%). This is mainly the result from a decrease of the deposition of SO2 
by 77%. The deposition of NOx decreased by 20% and the NH3 deposition remained at the same 
level. 
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Table 1: Deposition of acidifying substances. 
 
 Total acid 
deposition 
NOx SO2 NH3 
1980 7200 880 4140 2180 
1981 7240 880 4140 2220 
1982 6680 860 3580 2240 
1983 6280 880 3180 2220 
1984 6550 880 3400 2270 
1985 6850 850 3620 2380 
1986 6000 821 3020 2180 
1987 5900 840 2580 2480 
1988 4840 740 1920 2180 
1989 4640 750 1680 2210 
1990 4600 730 1660 2210 
1991 4340 690 1520 2130 
1992 4260 750 1540 1970 
1993 4520 740 1520 2260 
1994 4520 810 1320 2390 
1995 4040 740 1100 2200 
1996 3880 700 1100 2080 
1997 3990 700 960 2330 
2002  3300    
 
 
It is predicted that in 2002 the total acid deposition will be 3300. Still too much according to the 
scientists: they state that the maximum level of acid deposition that Dutch nature can handle is 
1400 acid equivalents/ha. This is also referred to as the ‘critical deposition level’.  
 
In addition, the RIVM gives an overview of the background of the acid deposition in 1997 in the 
Netherlands: 
 
 
 
Table 2: Contribution of foreign countries and various sectors to acid deposition in the 
Netherlands in 1997 in percentages 
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(From: RIVM, Milieubalans 1998) 
 
 
Countries/ sectors 
 
SO2 NOx NH3 Total 
Belgium 18,4 8,9 6,6 11 
France 9,7 8,2 1,9 6 
Germany 20,3 19,8 6,4 13 
Eastern Europe 4,8 2,6 0,7 3 
UK + Ireland 21,3 16,2 1,4 11 
Other countries 2,1 4,3 0,7 2 
 
Total foreign 
 
76,6 
 
59,9 
 
17,6 
 
45 
 
 
    
Consumers 0,3 2,3 4,0 2 
Other 1,6 1,0 0,2 1 
Industry 5,2 3,0 1,6 3 
Energysupply 1,8 2,2 0,0 1 
Refineries 6,7 0,6 0,0 2 
Agriculture 0,1 1,0 70,3 34 
transport 7,8 30,1 0,0 10 
Total  
The Netherlands 
 
23,4 
 
40,1 
 
82,4 
 
55 
 
 
In 1997, the biggest contributors to the acid deposition are the foreign countries (45%) and the 
Dutch agricultural sector (34%).  The agricultural sector (NH3) and the transport sector (NOx) are 
the sectors that are most problematic. The power generation industry nowadays is responsible 
for only 1% of the total acid deposition in the Netherlands in 1997!  The following table shows that 
in the past the sector had a significant contribution to the total SO2 and NOx emissions in the 
Netherlands.  
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Table 3: Emissions per targetgroup 
(Source: Dougle and Kroon, 1998, p: 45) 
 
NOx (kton) 1985 1990 1995 2000 (expected) 
 
Consumers 
 
26 
 
21 
 
22 
 
21 
Traffic 335 351 314 261 
Agriculture 6 10 15 27 
Industry 84 76 65 69 
Services 14 11 12 17 
Powergeneration 88 81 57 37 
Refineries 20 19 18 15 
Other 7 5 3 3 
 
Total 
 
580 
 
574 
 
506 
 
448 
 
 
SO2 (kton) 1985 1990 1995 2000 (expected) 
 
Traffic 
 
23 
 
27 
 
31 
 
22 
Industry 68 50 31 24 
Powergeneration 67 48 17 13 
Refineries 87 70 59 33 
Wastedisposal 3 3 1 1 
Other 8 5 4 1 
 
Total 
 
255 
 
203 
 
142 
 
94 
 
 
Production of electricity by combustion of coal, oil or gas causes emissions of SO2 (burning of 
coal) and Nox (all combustion processes). The next table shows how much electricity is produced 
in the Netherlands over the years 1993 – 1997 and how much SO2 and Nox is emitted. Please 
note that a small part of the production process does not lead to electricity generation but delivers 
heat. Of course, in this process emissions of SO2 and Nox do take place.  
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Table 4: Power generation in the Netherlands and the Emission of SO2 and NOx 
 
  1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 
- Production (GWh)  58 684 59 179 58 650 59 488 58 760 
• Coal (%) 
• Gas (%) 
• Nuclear (%) 
 
Co-generation (TJ) 
 40 
56 
4 
 
20 022 
41 
52 
7 
 
20 423 
45 
49 
6 
 
15 521 
42 
52 
6 
 
13 773 
37 
57 
6 
 
14 026 
 
Emission of SO2 
 
 
 
12 446 
 
18 693 
 
16180 
 
17 846 
 
22 080 
 
Emission of NOx 
  
35 174 
 
42 630 
 
48 880 
 
53 426 
 
58 543 
       
       
 
 
 
3. The power generation industry sector 1 
 
The Dutch electricity system developed out of small scale municipal electricity companies, 
established in the first decades of this century. Technology-improvements guided the 
electrification of the country, headed by SEP2 the grid co-ordinator since 1949. Between 1950 
and 1989, electricity generation and distribution was well organised in small scale monopolies, 
with clearly defined positions and legally authorised tasks reflecting the public utility character of 
electricity supply and the company’s public service obligations. Until 1989 the system was 
publicly owned and public service oriented in operation and performance.  
 
The years 1985-1998 mark a period of institutional instability in the Dutch electricity system, due 
to several tensions in the system and the emerging debate on the liberalisation of the European 
electricity market. Before 1985 generation, transport and distribution was integrated in 14 larger 
generation/distribution companies each holding leading market positions. Ten of them with 
provincial ownership structures and regionally based, and four with municipal ownership 
                                                
1 A large part of this section is written by dr.M.J. Arentsen, energy expert at the CSTM 
2 SEP stands for Samenwerkende ElektriciteitsProduktiebedrijven (Cooperating electricity production companies) 
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structures, operating in the urban areas in the western part of the country. A debate, started in 
1985 reinforced the need to improve the efficiency in electricity supply by concentration. 
Distribution and generation disintegrated and, mergers reduced the number of generation 
companies to four.1 SEP reinforced its leading and managing position in generation, and headed 
the technical and economic dispatch of the power plants owned by the four generation 
companies. SEP also headed the high voltage transport and import and export of electricity and 
the forecast of electricity demand and supply, legally obliged by the electricity act of 1989.  
 
In 1990, the year in which the covenant was signed, the electricity act 1989 provided for the legal 
structure of the Dutch electricity system. Table 3 displays the major features of the value chain of 
electricity as it was legally structured by the electricity act 1989.  
 
Table 5: Electricity Act of 1989 
 
Value chain Electricity act 1989 
Generation · Long term strategic and 
operational planning by SEP 
· Central economic and technical 
dispatch by SEP 
Transport/Services 
 
· De facto SEP monopoly 
· Technical dispatch by SEP, from 
1989 on also economic dispatch 
· Internal rules electricity industry 
Distribution · Geographic monopoly distribution 
company 
Wholesale · De facto SEP monopoly on import 
and export2 
Retailing  · Not operational, integrated with 
distribution 
Products and services · No (commercial) services in 
combination with electricity supply 
allowed 
 
                                                
1 The initiative to disintegrate generation and distribution was actually taken by the Dutch government of that time. For a 
more detailed description of the debate see, Arentsen, Künneke and Moll, 1997.  
2 The Electricity Act 1989 did allow for direct import of electricity by of giant consumers, but the costs on transport were 
high, leaving SEP in a de facto monopoly position.  
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The table clearly illustrates the distinction between production and distribution of electricity and 
the dominant position of SEP in generation and high voltage transmission. SEP also held a de 
facto monopoly in import and export of electricity. The actual functioning of the Dutch electricity 
system is illustrated in figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(The organisation of the Dutch electricity system upto 1995. Source: Arentsen e.a., 1997, p. 169) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SEP was organised as a limited liability company formed under private law, and the four 
regionally based generation companies, EPON, UNA, EZH and EPZ, were its shareholders. In 
the electricity act 1989 SEP was re-established as a co-ordinating device to safeguard efficiency 
in production and high voltage transmission of electricity. SEP developed a system of technical 
dispatch, allowing only the most efficient power plants to be connected to the grid, in combination 
with a system of national pooling prize. SEP was the co-ordinator of production by the four 
generation companies and it actually dominated generation and transmission in the Netherlands. 
SEP became the dominant player in the electricity system, deciding about import,  investments, 
transmission costs and electricity prices. Especially the Dutch distribution companies, owning 
Giant industrial
consumers
Other private and industrial consumers
Distributions
Decentral
production
Decentral
import
Central production & transport
EPON UNA EZH EPZ Central
production
Central co-
ordination &
planning
Central
import &
export
Germany France Belgium
SEP
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shares of two generation companies, were eager about the dominance of SEP, because SEP 
dominated decision making among production companies and dictated electricity prices.  
 
These distribution companies used the opportunity offered by the electricity act 1989 to start 
production of electricity outside the central generation capacity co-ordinated by SEP. They 
invested in CHP-technology, in many cases in joint venture with private industry, putting pressure 
on the centrally co-ordinated electricity generation. At the time distributors started their 
investments, CHP-technology became strongly supported by government for environmental 
reasons and with the help and support of private industry, distributors eroded the monopolistic 
price setting of the generation companies by creating overcapacity in the system. SEP and the 
generators were forced to negotiate an agreement with distributors to manage surplus capacities. 
In this way distributors managed to reshuffle positions vis à vis generation companies favourable 
to their own position. 
 
The institutional tensions, following these decentral production initiatives by distributors, were 
mitigated for a couple of years by the ongoing European debate on liberalisation of the European 
electricity market. Dutch public authorities took advanced positions in the European debate on 
liberalisation, guided by a change in political climate domestically. The social liberal coalition took 
over power in 1994 relieving the conservative coalition, in power for two decades and dominated 
by Christian democrats. The new coalition, strongly advocating liberalisation and deregulation, 
launched a White Paper on energy, designing new orders for the national energy system on 
electricity and gas by the end of 1995.1 In fact, the White Paper reflected liberalisation proposals 
developed and discussed by the European Union to harmonise the internal electricity and gas 
market. Dutch Parliament accepted and approved the liberalisation-ideas proposed by the social 
liberal coalition, marking the point of no return that accelerated the process of restructuring the 
national electricity supply industry. At the same time the EU accepted the final draft of the EU-
liberalisation directive,  the Dutch government took the next step in designing the new structure 
for the national electricity market that finally resulted in a proposal of a new electricity law by the 
end of 1997.  
 
Table 6 illustrates the main changes in the value chain of electricity as proposed by the new 
electricity act 1998.  
                                                
1 Derde Energienota , Dutch Parliament 1995-1996, 24 525, nrs. 1-2. 
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Table 6: The old and new electricity regime in the Netherlands  
 
Value chain Before 1998 After 1998 (effective after 2000) 
Generation · Long term strategic and 
operational planning by SEP 
· Central economic and technical 
dispatch by SEP 
· Free and unconditional except 
standard legal obligations  
Transport/Services 
 
· De facto SEP monopoly 
· Technical dispatch by SEP, from 
1989 on also economic dispatch 
· Internal rules electricity industry 
· Monopoly of the grid company 
· Free access based on a system of 
regulated TPA 
· Independent system operator 
Distribution · Geographic monopoly distribution 
company 
· System of licenses to supply 
captive customers  
· Tariff regulation and efficiency 
measures 
Wholesale · De facto SEP monopoly on import 
and export1 
· No restriction, but imports on the 
base of reciprocity 
Retailing  · Not operational, integrated with 
distribution 
· Free with the exception of grid 
companies 
· Stepwise free choice electricity 
supplier 
Products and services · No (commercial) services in 
combination with electricity supply 
allowed 
· No restrictions on products and 
services 
 
The act obliges an administrative and financial unbinding of generation, trade and supply on the 
one hand and transmission and distribution on the other. Access to the grid is arranged as 
regulated TPA and the market will be liberalised stepwise, beginning in 1999 (650 giant 
consumers > 2MW, representing 34% of the market), next in 2002 (some 56.000 small industrial 
consumers up to 3*80 Amp, representing 27% of the market) and finally in 2007 (some 6.7 million 
households, representing 39% of the market). In 1999 the act became operative and from that 
time on competition was launched in the Dutch electricity market.  
 
As a consequence, SEP will be dismantled and continued under the name TenneT, as the 
national transmission company in charge with the high voltage transport of electricity. The four 
                                                
1 The Electricity Act 1989 did allow for direct import of electricity by of giant consumers, but the tariff structure on  
transport made the imports de facto inefficient, leaving SEP in a de facto monopoly position.  
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producers no longer co-ordinate their generation activities as in the pre-1998 period by technical 
dispatch and national price pooling. By the end of 1999, two of the four generation companies 
were in a process of foreign take over.  
 
Finally, we present some key figures of the power generation sector in the Netherlands (Source: 
Annual Report SEP 1997): 
 
The emission of SO2 and NOx 
The production of electricity causes the emission of sulphurdioxde, nitrogen oxides and CO2.  
Thus within the sector, the environmental focus is on the acidification problem and the problem of 
climate change. In this paper the focus is on the acidification problem and the way the sector 
approaches the problem.   
 
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, the emissions of SO2 and NOx by the power generation 
industry have decreased significantly over the years. This is especially the case for the emission 
of SO2 as you can see in the table below. In the next section we will see how the sector achieved 
these reductions by explaining the Dutch acidification policy and the response (actions and 
approaches) of the power generation industry.  
 
Table 7: Environmental pressure power generation industry 
(Source: Environmental balance Sheet 1998, RIVM) 
 
(1980=100) 1980 1990 1995 1996 1997 2000 
(target) 
Production 100 103 105 102 101  
 
SO2 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
Nox 100 89 60 52 44 43 
 
 
 
4. Dutch Acidification Policy  
 
The problem of acidification came on the Dutch policy agenda in 1983:  a call was made for an 
extensive research on acidification and the effects on the environment. This was mainly due to 
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reports from Germany regarding serious damage to domestic forests. In 1984 the report 
concerning the problem of acidification (Notitie inzake de problematiek van de verzuring) was 
published. Following this report an extensive research program on acidification was set up 
(Additioneel Programma Verzuringsonderzoek) that would last till 1994. The interim outcomes of 
this extensive research formed the basis for the acidification policy of the Dutch government. The 
policy is formulated in the Acidification Abatement Plan (Bestrijdingsplan Verzuring, 1988-1989) 
and the National Environmental Policy Plans (NEPPs).  
 
Goals  
The first National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP1, 1989) includes objectives in order to 
combat the acidification problem. The objectives are formulated in terms of deposition levels to 
be reached in the coming years by the different sector/industries that contribute to the problem 
(see also page 8). Six months after the NEPP, the NEPP-Plus was published: the objectives 
regarding the acidification problem are sharpened (also based on commitments made by the 
industry, in particular the power generators!). The overall objective is to reach a maximum 
deposition level of 2400 acid equivalents (including sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and ammonia) 
in the year 2000 (65% reduction in deposition compared to deposition in 1985), and a maximum 
deposition level of 1400 acid equivalents in the year 2010 (80% reduction in deposition compared 
to 1985). To reach these objectives, the emissions of acidifying substances of various industries 
in the Netherlands but also emissions abroad (because these are imported in the Netherlands) 
should decrease significantly. For the power generation industry in the Netherlands the following 
targets are set in the NEPP-Plus: 
 Sulphur dioxide: maximum of 18 kiloton emission per year in the year 2000 (the SO2 
emissions in 1985 were 65 kiloton) 
 Nitrogen Oxide: maximum of 30 kiloton emission per year in the year 2000 (the NOx 
emission in 1985 were 82 kiloton) 
These objectives re-appeared in the national environmental policy plans that followed, NEPP-2 
(1993) and NEPP-3 (1998).  
 
Policy Instruments 
Since April 1987, the emissions of the power generating industry in the Netherlands are regulated 
via the Decree Emission Requirements Combustion Installations (Besluit emissie-eisen 
stookinstallaties, BEES). 
 
BEES- A (1987) focuses on large installations for which the provinces act as the responsible 
authorities (grant the permit). BEES-B (1990) focuses on installations in companies; here the 
local authority grants the permit.  Both Decrees involve emission requirements for SO2, NOx of 
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combustion installations. Requirements differ for various types of combustion plants (gas, coal, 
etc.) and also differ for existing or new plants; small or larger installations. BEES leaves it up to 
the sector to choose the best technology to meet the requirements. BEES implements the EU 
directive on large combustion plants (88/609/EEG) of 24 November 1988 (see next section).  
 
BEES-A is especially relevant for the power generating industry and it provides the legal 
framework for the Dutch government for combating SO2 and NOx emissions coming from 
electricity generation. The emission requirements in BEES have been sharpened a few times 
over the years also in order to comply with the EU directive.  
 
Besides regulation, a more voluntary approach was followed in 1990 when a covenant was 
signed between the power generation industry and the Dutch government (the national 
government and the provincial authorities). The covenant includes targets for reducing the 
emissions of sulphurdioxide and nitrogenoxides by the power generation industry and covers the 
period from 1990 till 2000. These targets correspond with the targets laid down in the NEPP-plus. 
The covenant gives the sector the freedom to determine the most cost-effective way/set of 
measures to reach the targets.  
In the Netherlands the covenant – or negotaited agreement – is used in combination with the 
permitting system included in regulation (see section 1). Also in this case, the covenant is 
combined with the permitsystem included in the Decree Emission Requirements Combustion 
Installations (BEES). In practice this means that the permitsystem will be maintained, and will 
take the agreements laid down in the covenant into account. This happens in two ways: (1) After 
signing of the covenant, the regulation, BEES, was revised in accordance with this agreement. 
For example, in the covenantt was agreed that existing plants will not be confronted with more 
strict emission requirements and that for new plants stricter emission requirements will be in 
place. This has been included in the regulation. (2) The covenant committed the sector to make 
up a Plan of Action that explains how the sector is planning  to reach the targets. The Plan of 
Action includes an overview of measures to be taken at the individual plants. These measures 
will be part of th epermit requests of the plants and this way the measures can be included in the 
permit given by the Province.   
 
Results 
The results of the overall acidification policy vary: The NEPP-2 (1993) states that the total acid 
deposition target of 2400 total acid equivalents/ha for the year 2000 and 1400 by the year 2010 
will not be achieved with the current policy. Indications are that the total acid deposition in the 
year 2000 will reach 2600 acid equivalents. The foreign countries play an important role in this 
setback (NEPP-2, 1993, p 77). Also, in the years that follow, data show that the targets set for 
 22
2000 and 2010 will not be achieved with current policy. The main bottle-necks are the emissions 
of nitrogenoxides (traffic) and ammonia (agriculture). The emissions of sulphurdioxide have been 
reduced significantly and are in line with the policy objectives. In the NEPP-3 (1998) the Dutch 
government decides to continue implementing the policy that was set out in earlier plans; to 
postpone the targets set for NOx and NH3 emission reductions to 2005; and to assess -by the 
end of the period covered by the NEPP-3 - the feasibility of the total deposition objectives.    
 
The power generation industry makes good progress with reducing its SO2 and NOx emissions. 1  
The SO2 emissions of the sector in 1994 were 17,8 kton which is already below the 18 kton 
target for the year 2000. The NOx emissions were 53,4 kton and this is in line with the target 
which was set at 55kton for 1994.  SO2 emissions in 1997 by the sector were 12,4 kton; NOx 
emissions in 1997 were 35,2 kton (source: progress report SEP, November 1998). 
 
 
Outlook 
Till the end of the plan period (2002), the policy will be maintained which means regulation via  
the Decree Emission Requirements Combustion Installations (BEES) and implementation of the 
agreements laid down in the covenant of 1990.  
 
It is not clear yet how the future will look beyond 2000/2002. The Dutch government aims to set 
new sharpened targets for SO2 and NOx emission reductions for the sector for the year 2010. 
For the sector, however, the future is not clear in more aspects since the electricity market is 
liberalising. This changes the context for discussions about reducing SO2 and NOx emissions. 
The discussion focuses on NOx: a new approach is tried out by the government: the idea is that 
extensive investments need to be made in order to reduce NOx emissions. Cost-efficiency is 
important in realising these reductions. Therefore the government chooses for the option of cost 
settlement (in Dutch: kostenverevening): one NOx target is set for the refineries, industry and 
energy companies. They can decide where its most cost efficient to realise the emission 
reduction. The discussions are still taking place, an agreement is expected to be ready by the 
end of this year (1999). 
 
 
5. European Policy 
 
International measures have been taken in the framework of the European Union and the 
Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations (ECE). In this last context, several 
                                                
1  In 1995, Minister de Boer (minister of VROM) reports to the parliament that the implementation of the covenant with the 
electricity sector progresses according to the agreement: the SO2 and NOx emission reductions will be reached in time 
(Milieu Management, January 1995, number 1, p. 7) 
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countries have signed an SO2/NOx protocol (Helsinki, 1985, Sofia 1988). The commitment laid 
down in the protocol is to reduce the SO2 emissions of 30% in 1993 relative to  1980, and to 
create a standstill of emissions of NOx in 1994 relative to 1987. A new SO2 protocol was signed 
in spring 1994 in Oslo and heads for reductions of 60% of the gap between actual (i.e. 1990) 
emissions and critical loads (deposition targets) in 2000, but for several countries exemptions 
and longer lead times are provided (Liefferink, 1995, p. 71). 
 
The third action program of the European Commission (1983) mentions the issue of acidification 
for the first time. This was mainly due to German pressure where the problem of forest die-back 
due to acid rain was high on the agenda. In the spring of 1983 an official proposal for a 
framework directive on air pollution was issued, followed later that year by the draft of a daughter 
directive setting limits for the emission of sulphur and nitrogen oxides from large combustion 
plants.  In November 1983, the Commission disclosed its integral view on the issue of 
acidification in a Communication to the Council (COM(83)721). In addition to the drafts just 
mentioned, a considerable reduction of car emissions formed part of that approach. Proposals to 
this end were published in 1983. Controversies about the issues of the ‘clean car’ and the large 
combustion plants dominated the Communities air pollution policy till the end of this decade. The 
Large Combustion Plants Directive was eventually adopted in 1988, and the car emission 
standards in 1991!  (Liefferink, 1995)   
 
The Large Combustion Plants Directive contains the European policy towards the power 
generation industry and gives for each country, reduction percentages for limiting the emission of 
SO2 and NOx coming from combustion plants (from electricity producers) built before July 1, 
1987. Two phases have been distinguished for NOx (1993 and 1998) and three for SO2 (1993, 
1998, and 2003). For combustion plants that were built after July 1987, specific emission 
requirements have been defined.  The Dutch emission requirements (laid down in BEES) are to 
some extent sharper than laid down in this directive (Thema document Verzuring, 1998, p. 65)   
 
III The Process 
 
 
6. Negotiations on a covenant concerning the reduction of SO2 and NOx  
emissions 
 
The Dutch government approached the sector in order to find a way of achieving maximum levels 
of the acidifying substances, SO2 and NOx which was needed in the context of the overall 
acidification policy.  In June 1990, the SEP signed a covenant with the government wit the aim to 
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lower the emissions  of SO2 and NOx.  Besides SEP, the minister of Public Housing, Planning 
and the Environment (ministry of Environment, and the 12 provinces signed the agreement. The 
period covered is ten years, 1990-2000.  
 
The negotiations started in the beginning of 1989. Discussions between the power generation 
sector and the government regarding SO2 emission reduction however started already in the 
seventies. SEP always had been interested to agree on a ‘bubble’ or an overall emission ceiling 
for the sector sothat they were not confronted anymore with arbitrary decisions of provincial 
authorities. Because of an overall trend of decentralisation, these discussions never led to an 
agreement on an emission ceiling for the whole sector. 
 
In 1987 the Decree Emission Requirements Combustion Installations (BEES) was announced 
regulating the emissions of the power generation industry in the Netherlands. BEES provided the 
legal framework for combating the SO2 and NOx emissions coming from electricity generation.    
 
In 1989 representatives of the ministry of Environment, SEP and the provinces (represented by 
their association IPO) started discussions on a ceiling for SO2 and NOx emissions for the whole 
power generation sector. Text proposals of the covenant were discussed in meetings (February 
and March 1989) between representatives of SEP, ministry of Environment and IPO.  The 
ministry chaired these meetings. The discussions focused on elements of the covenant:  
- The ministry of Environment and IPO wish to include a target for SO2/NOx emission in the 
 year 1994. Initially SEP opposed to this.  
- SEP would like to have a representative of the ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) in the  
covenants commission. VROM and IPO did not agree. 
- SEP objected to the arrangement that the covenants commission could terminate the  
covenant in case the agreements can not result in the emission reduction for 2000.  
However, most import difference of opinion between SEP and IPO/Ministry of Environment was 
on the emission reduction targets of SO2 and NOx to be set for the year 2000. In the discussions 
IPO and VROM sticked to the targets of a maximum of 25 million kg SO2 emission in the year 
2000 and a maximum of 30 million kg NOx emission in the year 2000 (these numbers are usually 
referred to as 25/30 SO2/NOx). SEP held to targets of  30 million kg SO2 emission in 2000 and 
40 million kg emission in 2000. The Dutch government based its numbers on two policy 
documents that were in preparation during that period, namely the Acidification Abatement Plan 
(in Dutch: Bestrijdingsplan Verzuring) and the first National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP). 
The negotiations for the covenant were not completed when the NEPP was published. The NEPP 
included a maximum of 30/40 SO2/NOx for 2000. However, based on insights gathered during 
the preparation of the Acidification Abatement Plan the Dutch government was convinced that the 
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25/30 targets for SO2/NOx were realistic. SEP argued that these stricter targets did not leave 
enough room to implement the emission reductions in a cost effective manner. In a meeting on 
June 29, 1989  this difference in opinion regarding the targets for SO2 and NOx emission 
reduction resulted in the termination of the discussions: SEP withdraw itself from the 
negotiations. 
 
Now, the government started to prepare the revisement of the existing regulation for SO2 and 
NOx emissions by the power generation industry, the Decree Emission Requirements 
Combustion Installations (in Dutch: Besluit Emissie Eisen Stookinstallaties, BEES): stricter 
emission requirements would be included for all installations1. 
 
The ministry stopped working on the regulation when in the beginning of 1990 (January 10) again 
a meeting is arranged between SEP, Ministry of Environment and IPO, this time at the request of 
SEP. Since their last meeting (June 29, 1989), a new Cabinet assumed office and the National 
Environmental Policy Plan has been revised to the NEPP-Plus: the acidification targets have 
been sharpened.  According to an expert at SEP, SEP postponed the negotiations exactly for the 
reason that the Cabinet fell:” SEP could not do business with a government who lacked political 
legitimacy”. In any case, SEP returned to the negotiation table. In this second round of 
discussions very soon a compromise was found between the negotiation partners. One agreed to 
the stricter emission targets (aimed for by the Dutch government) but allowed some flexibility for 
the sector in reaching those targets: A maximum of 18 kiloton SO2 emission in the year 2000 
plus four and three kiloton in case of malfunctioning of the equipment and a maximum of 30 
kiloton NOx emission in the year 2000 plus 5 kiloton for implementing co-generation and (in the 
next section this will be further explained). These targets correspond with the policy set out in the 
NEPP-plus.   
 
The provinces had representatives in the negotiations who reported back to the Interprovincial 
Consultancy Organ (IPO). In the beginning of the process the position of the provinces was one 
of doubt: as the permitting authority for the electricity producers they were not convinced of the 
(environmental) benefits that the covenant would bring: whether the SO2 and NOx emission 
reductions agreed upon in the covenant would actually be larger than by implementing the 
regulation, BEES. At the same time they found it difficult to foresee the (technical) developments 
in the future and to make a sensible estimation of emissions. In addition, the provinces did not 
have a clear view at that time how the covenant would work in practice and what role the 
provinces would keep. And the instrument of a covenant was new to the provinces. During the 
                                                
11 The Ministry changed from a consensus seeking approach to a strategy of confrontation (Report Nature and 
Environment Foundation, 1992, p 61).  
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discussions they learned how to negotiate. In the meetings the provinces and the ministry of 
Environment were on the same side and discussed their positions before going into the meetings 
with SEP. In the second round of discussions the provinces made a case for realising a regional 
diffusion of the emission reductions by the power generators. In a side letter going with the 
covenant this has been agreed by SEP.    
 
The ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) was not directly involved in the negotiations. This ministry 
is the responsible ministry for power generation and has certain tasks based on the Electricity 
Law of 1989. However, since the subject of discussion was the acidification problem, the ministry 
of Environment was the speaking partner. In fact, the ministry of Economic Affairs was at first not 
very pleased  that SEP was talking to the ministry of Environment directly and that they were not 
(directly) involved. SEP saw advantages in the new (target group) approach of the ministry of 
Environment and was willing to negotiate with the ministry of Environment. The ministry of 
Economic Affairs got a (observation) position in the Covenants Commission.  
In the end, the ministry of Environment and SEP were both very satisfied with the outcome of the 
negotiations. Respondents from both organisations consider it to be a win-win situation: The 
ministry of Environment had a commitment of the sector to achieve an significant reduction of 
SO2 and NOx emissions. SEP at the same time had the freedom to implement the agreement in 
the most cost-effective way since the focus was on aggregate levels (maximum emission levels 
for the whole sector, not for individual plants).  The provinces were happy with the success of the 
negotiations in which they played a role but were more sceptic about the value added of the 
covenant compared to the regulation.  
 
 
7. Contents of the Covenant 
 
Commitments 
The specific objectives for 2000 laid down in the covenant are a maximum of 18 million kg SO2 
emission, and a maximum of 30 million kg of NOx emission. To be able to proceed with the co-
generation of electricity, SEP is allowed to exceed the NOx ceiling with maximum 5 million kg per 
year (article 3). In case of the malfunctioning of the desulpharisation equipment in coal fired 
electricity plants, and the plant is within legal limits, the emission ceiling is raised by 4 million ton 
SO2. This corrected ceiling can be exceeded by 3 million ton once every three year (article 4)   
     
SEP commits itself to develop a Plan of Action within 6 months after concluding the covenant 
(Article 7 of the covenant). This plan gives a detailed overview of how Sep intends to achieve the 
reduced emission levels. Sep could do this because of its special position within the sector (see 
section 5): it has co-ordinating tasks regarding production but also the cost pooling system!  
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The covenant states that the minister of VROM will take the agreement into account when 
developing further regulation on the matter (article 5). This is a reference to BEES which would 
be revised just after the agreement: existing plants would not be confronted with more strict 
emission requirements. For new plants stricter emission levels would be in place. And the 
provinces who are the licensing authority agreed to operate in line with the provisions of the 
covenant and the Plan of Action.  
 
Monitoring 
The covenant obliges SEP to write a progress report every two year. A commission is established 
with representation of the involved parties (Ministry of Environment, Provinces and SEP). The 
ministry of Economic Affairs gets a (observation) position in the Commission. The task of the 
commission is to guide the implementation process of the covenant, evaluate the progress 
reports and to serve as a discussion forum in case conflicts arise. 
 
Evaluation and Continuation 
The covenant commits the partners to make a new agreement on SO2 and NOx reduction when 
the contract comes to an end (article 22). 
 
Legal framework 
The legal framework is formed by the Air Pollution Law, in particular by the Decision on Emission 
Levels of Combustion Plants (BEES). BEES gives specific maximum emission levels allowed for 
combustion plants on which the provinces provide permits to the companies. After signing the 
agreement, BEES will be revised in concordance with the provisions of the agreement.  
The covenant does not formulate individual emission requirements for the individual plants. The 
Plan of Action that SEP needed to make for implementing the covenant, however did specify the 
measures that were planned for individual installations in order to reduce the emissions. 
Accordingly, this has been translated into the individual permits for the plants.  
 
 
8. Implementing the covenant 
 
The implementation of the covenant by SEP proceeds very well. Within 6 months SEP presented 
its Plan of Action which was approved by the Commission. The basis of the Plan is cost 
effectiveness. SEP operated (and still operates) a counting program which includes all the 
combustion plants. This program is used to implement the cost pooling mechanism that involves  
production costs of all companies. This program was used to define the most cost effective 
measures. SEP started with a scenario - setting out the trend  till 2000- in which no extra 
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measures were taken. This scenario gave insight into how many extra measures were needed to 
achieve the emission reductions. SEP asked the companies to propose projects for decreasing 
the emissions of SO2 and NOx. A selection was made by SEP after which the companies made 
more detailed costs estimates. This was an interactive process between the companies and SEP 
which was possible because of the openness in information exchange. In the end, some 70 
measures were selected for implementation and included in the Plan of Action. The reason that 
SEP was able to develop the Plan of Action in the most cost effective way was the existence of 
the cost pooling mechanism.  
 
The sector took three basic measures to reach the SO2 emission reductions: 
1. The older coal-fired plants without desulpharisation were taken out of operation. 
2. The other coal-fired plants have been equipped with fluegas desulpharisation installations.  
Moreover, the desulpharisation installations have improved, sothat desulpharisation 
percentages are reached exceeding 90%.  
3. Coal is used containing less sulphur. 
(Themadocument verzuring 1998, p. 43)  
 
To combat the NOx emissions, some of the old coal-fired plants have been replaced by gas-fired 
installations.  Other measures include the installation of certain technologies such as the 
Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR)/denox  or High temperature NOx Reduction.  
 
Costs 
The environmental costs of the energysector 19985-1997 
 
Costs 
mln DFL 
1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 
 
Acidification 
 
 
61 
 
346 
 
558 
 
630 
 
623 
 
Most of the environmental costs are made for reduction of the emission of acidifying substances 
from electricity producing companies. These costs made up 50% of the total environmental costs 
of the energy sector in 1997 and were 28% of the total costs made within the acidification policy 
(source: environmental balance sheet 1998, RIVM).   
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An expert at SEP estimates that the total costs of implementing the covenant are around 500 
million DFL. He adds that without the covenant, it would have cost twice as much to achieve the 
same targets. 
 
From 1990 on, SEP reported every two year to the Commission on the progress made in 
reducing SO2 and NOx emissions and provided an overview of further plans till the year 2000. 
According to all respondents (from SEP, ministry of Environment, and the province) these 
meetings were always very satisfying. Sometimes the Plan of Action had to be adapted because 
some techniques or technologies did not perform as expected. SEP had to introduce other 
measures in order to reduce the SO2 and NOx emissions. The most important means of SEP to 
fulfil the emission requirements were the closing down of coal-fired power plants that had no 
abatement equipment; equip other plants with fluegas desulpharisation installations (to reduce 
SO2 emissions) and/or SCR (to reduce NOx emissions). Also coal was used that contained less 
sulphur. 
Within a few years, the reductions of SO2 emissions were achieved. However the sector was not 
prepared to open up the covenant and set new emission targets, as a respondent from the 
provinces explained. In the same context two issues came up and were discussed in the 
commission meetings: (1) SEP proposed to use coals that contain more sulphur; although coals 
with a lower percentage of sulphur were available they were too expensive according to SEP. 
SEP wanted to use the extra ‘emission space’ they had to use the less expensive coals. (2) The 
percentage of desulpharisation realised by the installations exceeded the 90% while the covenant 
required 85%. The companies wanted to run their installation at the 85% level since this would be 
cheaper. This point was brought into the meeting by the provinces who ran into this problem in 
their dealings with the companies. SEP agreed with VROM and the provinces that this was not a 
good practice.   
 
The progress reports show the emission reductions in SO2 and NOx by the power generation 
sector: 
 
Table 8: Emission of SO2 and NOx by the power generating industry (source: progress 
reports covenant, SEP) 
 
Emissions SO2 NOx 
1990 
1991 
44 815 
34 551 
72 474 
68 207 
1992 28 753 65 475 
1993 22 080 58 543 
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1994 17 846 53 426 
1995 16 180 48 880 
1996 18 693 42 630 
1997 12 446 35 174 
2000 (target) 18 000 30 000 
 
 
 
Follow up discussions 
A new round of discussions between SEP and the ministry of Environment has taken place to 
explore the ground for a new covenant setting targets beyond 2000. They agreed that -as long as 
there is no follow up covenant - the current agreement remains valid. A covenant nowadays will 
have to be negotiated with the separate electricity producing companies since SEP will cease to 
exist in its current form. However, as it looks now, a joint agreement including three sectors: the 
industry, refineries and the electricity producers on NOx emission reduction is more feasible. The 
basis for such an agreement is cost settlement. According to a respondent at the ministry of 
Environment, they hope to finalise the deal by the end of this year. The fact that the electricity 
market is changing - the liberalisation - makes the negotiations more difficult, but not impossible.  
 
 
IV Analysis of the case 
 
In this part of our report we will look for factors that can explain the performance of this case - the 
covenant on SO2 and NOx emission reduction by the power generating industry. First we will 
assess the performance of the covenant. 
 
 
9. The Performance of the covenant  
 
“Within the government, this covenant is seen as a success story” says an expert of the ministry 
of Environment. He refers to the targets on SO2 and NOx emission reduction that are included in 
the covenant. Sofar, the emission reductions are in line (or even ahaed) with the timeschedule.    
Our theoretical framework provides an extensive evaluation framework in which the success (or 
not) of a negotiated agreement is not only related to the question if the targets have been 
reached: performance, the dependent variable -  here is made up of the following aspects that 
are linked to various stages in the policy process: 
1. Feasibility: Is the covenant administratively, legally and politically feasible? 
2. Capability: Is the covenant capable of achieving the policy objectives? 
3. Impact: What are the environmental, economic and social impacts of the covenant?  
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4. Resource Development: Has the formulation/implementation and operation of the covenant 
enhanced the policy resource base (in terms of relationships, awareness or learning)   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The policy process and performance indicators 
 
AgreementNegotiations
Imple-
mentation Output
Field
proces Effects
1 2 3
4
1 Feasibility 2 Capability 3 Effectiveness and efficiency 4 Resource Development
 
 
 
Feasibility 
The negotiations resulted in a covenant and thus we can conclude that a covenant was feasible. 
The initiative to start the negotiations came from the Dutch government in the context of the 
overall acidification policy. The power generation industry, represented by SEP, was willing to 
negotiate with the government. It was very clear that the alternative for the covenant was that the 
emission reductions would be required via regulation! The ministry of Environment intended to 
sharpen the regulations that would mean that all combustion plants need extra equipment to 
reduce SO2 and NOx emissions. SEP foresaw enormous investments and wanted the freedom 
to achieve the targets in the most cost effective way possible. The ministry of Environment aimed 
for the commitment of the sector because they expected more success in reducing SO2 and NOx 
than requiring it via regulation. The third party in the negotiations, the provinces represented by 
the IPO, hesitated, but were convinced by the ministry of Environment of the benefits of this 
approach.  
One can speak of a clear win-win situation since both parties had a clear interest to come to an 
agreement. 
 
Capability 
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The covenant has proved to be very capable of achieving the set targets: a maximum amount of 
emission of SO2 and NOx by the electricity producers in the year 2000. In between targets have 
been set for 1994. The covenant includes a clear set of targets that can be easily monitored. 
Also, the commitments for each partner laid down in the covenant are clear and easy to control.  
 
The covenant does not explicitly include a burden sharing mechanism since such a mechanism 
already exists in the sector: it is the responsibility of SEP to achieve the targets for the sector as 
total. Herein lies the main advantage and reason for SEP to sign the covenant in the first place: 
they have got the opportunity to achieve the targets in the most cost effective way. SEP was also 
very much in the position to do so: it had central co-ordination tasks regarding the generation of 
electricity by the four producers and the price setting. The covenant obliged SEP to develop a 
detailed Plan of Action within 6 months after concluding the agreement: the Plan of Action 
needed to include an overview of how the sector is going to achieve the targets, and an overview 
of the emission targets for each combustion plant! 
 
As mentioned earlier, monitoring is one of the strong aspects of this covenant. Based on the Plan 
of Action, the producers knew exactly what their targets were: the covenant states that these 
targets are included in the permit that the provinces give to the producers. And each electricity 
producer needs to report every year to the province and SEP on the emission of SO2 and NOx.  
In addition, the covenant commits SEP to report every two year to the covenants commission that 
had been established especially to guide the implementation of the covenant.    
 
In case problems or conflicts occur in the implementation, the covenant installs a commission to 
serve as a kind of discussion forum that ultimately can decide that the covenant is terminated. In 
more individual cases, the province which is the permitting authority for the combustion plants 
can decide to take measures in case the plant is not complying with the provisions of the 
covenant.  
 
We can conclude that the covenant in theory is very capable of achieving the targets. In practice, 
this has also been the case. SEP co-ordinates the implementation of the covenant. It made a 
Plan of Action for the sector which was approved by the commission. Every two year a progress 
report is published. 
 
Impact 
The environmental impact or effectiveness of the covenant is the reduced SO2 and NOx 
emissions from the combustion plants. Earlier in this report we have seen that the SO2 - and 
NOx emissions have been reduced significantly.  
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To achieve the reductions in SO2 emission, the sector took the following measures: 
1. Closure of coal-fired plants without abatement technology 
2. New Coal-fired plants with abatement technology 
3. Fuel-substitution 
4. Changes in the type of coal used (the percentage of S in the Coal) 
5. Improvement of the abatement equipment  
To reduce NOx emissions, some of the old coal fired plants have been replaced by gas 
installations. And some plants installed denox installations. 
The SO2 emission reductions were reached within a few years. A large part of the reductions 
were realised by the closure of old coal-fired plants without abatement technology. These plants 
were on the list to be closed because of their life-time and (BEES) regulation. The covenant might 
have speeded up this process a little. Furthermore, the sector made some improvements with the 
desulphurisation equipment over the years. At the same time however, the sector has started to 
use coals that contain more sulphur instead of less.1  It is a question to what extent the 
reductions of SO2 emissions by the power generating industry are due to the covenant? There is 
no easy answer. What would have happened if there hadn’t been a covenant and normal practice 
would have taken place complying with the BEES regulation? It seems that the effect of the 
covenant is clearly visible at a macro level where the reductions of SO2 and NOx emissions are 
guaranteed by the sector. At a micro level, however, sometimes higher emissions can occur.  
 
The covenant offered SEP the opportunity to achieve the targets at sector level in the most cost-
effective way. The covenant did not add anything to the emission requirements for individual 
power plants, only an aggregate emission ceiling was agreed upon. SEP used the existing cost 
pooling mechanism to implement the covenant. Although no financial assessment has been 
made regarding the costs that were involved in implementing the covenant, it can be assumed 
that implementation took place in an efficient manner. 2  
 
Resource development 
When the covenant was signed in 1990, it was not very clear what technical developments would 
occur. SEP has been experimenting with some new techniques and in that sense, the covenant 
has stimulated learning on technical options to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions by combustion 
plants in cost effective way. On the other hand, no new innovative technologies have been 
developed the last ten years. There was also no reason too since it was very clear in the 
                                                
1 Implementing 88/609/EEC in the Netherlands: A case study on environmental effectiveness, allocative efficiency, 
productive efficiency and administrative costs, Kris Lulofs, Enschede, May 1999 
2 A financial overview of the costs made by the sector to implement the covenant was not available.  Respondents at SEP 
estimated that the total costs were about 500 million dollar to reduce the emission levels of SO2 and NOx. They also 
estimated that if the same reductions would have to be achieved by regulation, costs would have increased by factor two.   
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beginning of the process that the sector would achieve the targets. Thus, the incentive was 
missing. The fluegas desulpharisation installations have improved over the years.  
The people working within the power generating companies are  enthusiastic regarding the 
covenant. For the government, in many respects this covenant was a kind of pilot project to try 
out the instrument of negotiated agreement. In that sense, the covenant performed very well, 
getting everyone (business and regional and state authorities) involved enthusiastic about this 
way of working together and learn how to work together in a different relationship.  
 
In terms of relationships, the covenant has been without doubt very rewarding. Relationships 
have been built and trust and respect between the partners has grown over the years. However, 
it is difficult to see what this will mean for the future since the electricity market is changing now 
from a monopolistic market to a market based on competition. For one, this means that prices will 
matter in the future. The electricity companies will operate as real businesses in an open and 
competitive market which surely will change their agenda. Prices and thus production costs will 
become very important. SEP will be dismantled as the co-ordinating organisation of production 
and will continue under the new name TenneT, as the national transmission organisation.  
 
To conclude, we can say that the performance of the covenant has been well: the covenant was 
feasible because all partners saw an advantage in closing an agreement together; the covenant 
was capable since it included a clear set of targets, a burden sharing mechanism and monitoring 
system. Its effectiveness is good insofar the targets for SO2 and NOx emission reduction have 
been achieved. However, it is questionable to what extent the reductions can be ascribed to the 
efficacy of the covenant.  It can be assumed that the agreement has been very efficient due to 
the cost pooling mechanism within the sector. Finally, the covenant developed its resourcebase 
mainly in terms of relationship building and learning about working in the setting of a covenant.    
 
10. Explaining the Performance: the institutional context and characteristics of  
the covenant 
 
 
Based on earlier work on covenants, the NEAPOL project team formulated four hypotheses 
which include relations between certain factors from the institutional context and the performance 
of the covenant.  These factors- or the independent variables - are: 
1. presence of an alternative instrument 
2. tradition of trust, respect 
3. the structure of the sector: homogeneous/heterogeneous 
4. the distance to the consumer  
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Policy hypothesis: the fact that the public environmental policy evolves in a tradition and in a 
climate of consensus seeking, joint problem solving, mutual respect and trust is a crucial positive 
factor for the performance of negotiated agreements. 
 
In policy making in the Netherlands, you can certainly speak of a tradition of consensus seeking, 
joint problem solving and mutual respect. The Netherlands is well known for this approach all 
over the world. Policymakers have experience in working with the instrument of negotiated 
agreements. More specifically, the relationship between the Dutch government, in particular the 
ministry of Environment, and the power generators goes back to the seventies when the idea of 
one emission ceiling for the whole sector was discussed. Also, relations were built in the context 
of the making of the regulation, BEES (around 1985) . 
 
When the ministry of Environment approached the sector in 1989 to discuss a covenant on the 
emissions of SO2 and NOx, SEP was happy to respond to this invitation. Relationships between 
the provinces and the power generation companies existed longer resulting from the discussions 
on the permits given by the provinces.    
 
For two partners at the table - the ministry of Environment and SEP - the possible advantages of 
signing a covenant were clear: the ministry created a commitment by the sector to achieve a 
significant reduction of SO2 and NOx emissions. SEP at the same time had the freedom to 
implement the agreement in the most cost-effective way since the focus was on aggregate levels. 
In addition, the ministry of Environment really wanted this approach to work and wanted a 
success to legitimise working with negotiated agreements as a policy instrument. The provinces 
on the other hand, remained reserved during the process because they were not convinced that 
a covenant was the best approach. This attitude can also be explained from the recognition that 
the provinces - being the permitgiving authority for the combustion plants - always have had a big 
influence on the standards that were set regarding SO2 and NOx emissions. The covenant would 
decrease this influence. Nevertheless the provinces were also willing to try the covenant 
approach. Between the discussion partners a sense of respect and trust existed; knowledge 
(technical) regarding the emissions of SO2 and NOx by the sector and possible solutions were 
present with all three actors. Conflicts during the negotiations were solved by looking for 
compromises and a certain degree of openness of discussion between the partners also made 
this possible.  
 
Conclusion: In the negotiations before signing the covenant, there was an atmosphere of 
consensus seeking and joint problem solving. The starting point was a positive attitude of the 
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discussion partners aiming to make the negotiations a success. An important factor for the 
success of the negotiations was the recognition of a win-win situation. The hypothesis is not 
rejected.  
 
  
Instrumental hypothesis: The fact that the public policy makers show readiness to use 
alternative policy instruments, as a stick behind the door to deal with the environmental problems, 
in case the negotiated agreement fails, is a crucial positive factor for the performance of 
negotiated agreements. 
 
Clearly, the stick was present, namely the Decree Emission Requirements Combustion plants 
(BEES). If the negotiations would fail to result in an agreement, the government would have 
revised BEES to include stricter emissions for SO2 and NOx. For NOx this meant that every plant 
needed an expensive SCR installation. The government also made this very clear during the 
negotiations. In fact, when SEP withdraw from the negotiations because of a conflict regarding 
the targets to be set for 2000 (maximum levels of SO2 and NOx emissions), the government 
started to prepare the revisement of BEES. Before the revisement was finalised, however SEP 
requested to re-open discussions about a covenant. This time, the negotiations resulted in a 
covenant.  
 
Conclusion: The presence of a viable and credible alternative steering mechanism provided an 
incentive to the sector to take the negotiations seriously and to strive for a consensus when 
possible. The hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Sectoral hypothesis: The fact that the industry sector is homogeneous, has a small number of 
players is dominated by one or two players, or has a powerful industry association that can speak 
for all its members, is a crucial positive factor for the performance of negotiated agreements 
 
In 1990, the power generation industry sector was very homogeneous, had a small number of 
players (four large producers) and a powerful association (SEP). The electricity sector was rather 
special compared with other sectors: it was a very protected market, no competition, extra costs 
could easily be included in the prices consumers pay for electricity. SEP played a central role in 
the sector with co-ordinating tasks in electricity production and planning and price setting. In this 
setting, SEP could indeed speak for its members during the negotiations. Even more important, 
SEP had the capacity and authority to translate the covenant into specific actions of the 
companies to reduce the emissions.   
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The electricity sector is changing rapidly towards a more open, competitive market. This is due to 
the European legislation which requires a liberalisation of the market.  This means that SEP will 
be dismantled as the co-ordinating organisation for production. With the current discussion on 
further reduction of NOx emissions, the ministry of Environment indeed already experiences that 
this development makes the discussions with the sector more difficult. For one, because now 
discussions take place with the individual companies around the table instead of talking to one 
partner, SEP representing the sector. But more importantly, the interests of the power generation 
companies differ dependent upon their position in the market.  
 
Conclusion: The homogeneous nature of the power generation sector that made the various 
aspects of the agreement relevant to all members, and the dominant position of SEP in the sector 
that made it a negotiation partner with which the government could actually ‘talk business’ made 
the sector very ‘accessible’ for a negotiated agreement approach. Moreover, the fact that SEP 
was so powerful to co-ordinate and control the implementation of the covenant (via the cost 
pooling mechanism) played a crucial role in the performance (applicability and effectiveness and 
efficiency) of the covenant. The sectoral hypothesis is not rejected 
 
Competition Hypothesis: The fact that industries are close to the final markets, is a crucial 
factor for the performance of negotiated agreements, due to consumer pressure. 
 
The idea behind this hypothesis is that image with consumers is important for industry which then 
can be an incentive for improving the performance. In this case the link between selling directly to 
consumers and being dependent on the industry’s image with these consumers is not obvious. 
Until recently the electricity market was non competitive and in addition consumer electricity 
demand is rather inelastic. Therefore, in 1990, image did not play a role for the electricity 
producing sector. In fact, the electricity market was not close to its consumers in the sense that it 
should be afraid to lose clients. This situation is changing now.  
 
Conclusion: In this case, the competition hypothesis does not provide an explanation for the 
performance of the covenant.  
 
 
V Conclusion 
 
In 1990, one of the major contributors to the acidification problem in the Netherlands was the 
power generation industry. The Dutch government formulated an acidification policy in which 
targets for emission reduction were set for the relevant sectors, including the power generation 
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sector. After one year of negotiations, the Dutch ministry of Environment, the provinces and SEP 
(representing the sector) signed a covenant on the reduction of emissions of sulphurdioxide and 
nitrogenoxides. Almost ten years later, the covenant has proven to be a success: the emission 
targets have been realised within the agreed timeframe. 
 
The hypotheses, except for the last one -the competition hypothesis - all provide explanations for 
the performance of the covenant:  
1. Trust, respect for each other positions in the negotiations and the recognition of a possible 
win-win situation (policy hypothesis);  
2. The fact that regulation was a real alternative for the negotiated agreement gave an extra 
incentive to the negotiations (instrumental hypothesis).  
3. For the government it was very easy to discuss and make agreements with the sector: SEP 
was a powerful association that was able to speak for its members during the negotiations. 
The role/position of the SEP and the structure of the sector and electricity market in the 
Netherlands during the nineties made it possible that the covenant was implemented 
successfully in a cost efficient way (sectoral hypothesis).  
 
The presence of these factors provided a fruitful setting for negotiating and implementing the 
covenant. Important for the success of the covenant - the achievement of its emission reduction 
targets - has also been the contents of the covenant itself (which in itself is an outcome of the 
negotiation process and thus an aspect of performance, namely capability) : the fact that the 
covenant included a clear set of targets, a timeschedule and provisions regarding monitoring  and 
reporting.  
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Appendix I 
 
Covenant concerning the combatting of SO2 and NOx 
 
 
Contents 
 
I Definitions 
Article 1: interpretation 
 
II Objectives 
Article 2: emission ceilings 
Article 3: heat 
Article 4: fault rules 
 
III State Obligations 
Article 5: rules 
 
IV Sep Obligations 
Par. 1 Obligation to endeavour 
Article 6: measures 
 
Par. 2 Plan of Action 
Article 7: time of establishment and content 
Article 8: adaptation and alteration 
 
Par. 3 Execution of the Plan of Action 
Article 9: responsibility 
Article 10: individual electricity generation companies 
Article 11: report 
 
V  Obligations of the Provinces 
Article 12: exercise of the competence 
Article 13: report 
 
VI The Commission 
Par. 1 Composition 
Article 14: the Commission 
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Par. 2  Evaluating and altering the Plan of Action 
Article 15: evaluation criteria 
Article 16: deviation from the Plan of Action 
Article 17: alteration of the Plan of Action 
 
Par. 3 Advice 
Article 18: granting advice 
 
Par 4  Evaluating the report 
Article 19: evaluation criteria 
 
VII Amendment and termination 
Article 20: amendment 
Article 21: termination 
 
VIII Miscellaneous 
Article 22: evaluation and continuation 
Article 23: environmental care 
 
 
1 The State of the Netherlands, here represented by the Minister of Public Housing, 
Planning and Environmental Management 
 
2 The public limited company (SEP) Co-operating Electricity Generation Companies N.V., 
here represented by N.G. Ketting (engineer) also acting on behalf of the individual 
electricity generating companies based upon the powers of attorney annexed to this 
covenant. 
 
3 The Province of Groningen 
 
4 The Province of Friesland 
 
5 The Province of Drente 
 
6 The Province of Overijssel 
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7 The Province of Gelderland 
 
8 The Province of Flevoland 
 
9 The Province of Utrecht 
 
10 The Province of North Holland 
 
11 The Province of South Holland 
 
12 The Province of Zeeland 
 
13 The Province of North Brabant 
 
14 The Province of Limburg 
 
All represented by Mr. C.J. Kover, chairman of the board of trustees of the Interprovincial 
management, empowered as appears from the powers of attorney annexed to this covenant. 
 
Having duly considered: 
 
- that the gravity of the problem of the increasing acidity as emerges from, inter alia, the 
Interim Evaluation Note on Acidity dated 23 December 1987 (lower house papers II, 
1987/1988, 18 225, no. 22) and the Plan to Combat Acidity dated 20 July 1989 (lower 
house papers II, 1988/1989, 18 225, no. 31) compels far-reaching measures to combat 
the emission of acidifying matter, identified in both papers, so that in the long term an 
acceptable level, according to the papers, of acid deposit can be attained,  
 
- that this acceptable level cannot be reached in the year 2000, but that measures can be 
taken to bring us close to the realisation of the objective is every target group and the 
rest of the world, identified in the above-mentioned papers, make their contribution, 
 
- that since the entry into the Decision concerning the emission requirements for boilers 
Law concerning air pollution (Wet inzake de luchtverontreiniging, Stb. 1987, 164), the 
technical possibilities for limiting the emission of SO2 and NOx have been improved, 
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- that an amendment of the Decision concerning the emission requirements for boilers Law 
concerning air pollution shall be prepared in the interests of giving a more far-reaching 
limitation of the acidifying emissions a legal basis, that it is nevertheless otherwise 
desirable and possible in the short term to create clarity as to the contribution of one of 
the target groups to this more far-reaching limitation, 
 
- that the SEP and the individual electricity generation companies wish to make an 
important contribution to the necessary far-reaching fight against the emission of SO2 
and NOx and the individual electricity generation companies have declared their 
preparedness and ability to make a contribution, 
 
- that in particular, the SO2 emissions from the electricity generation companies have 
reduced markedly since 1980 as a result of combat measures and the NOx emissions 
have in the same period virtually remained at the same levels,  
 
- that if electricity consumption develops as indicated in the Electricity Plan of 1989-1998, 
the execution of this plan shall lead to a further lowering of the SO2 emissions and a 
lowering of the NOx emissions, while it is anticipated that the results of an extensive 
research programme, development and demonstration to be executed by the electricity 
generation companies shall lead to a further lowering of the NOx emissions, 
 
- that on the basis of the Note reconsidering the main features of  energy policy (lower 
house papers II, 1988/1989, 21 061, no. 1) SEP has been granted the opportunity for the 
Electricity Plan 1990-2000 to construct new gas units alongside new coal units, 
 
- that indeed energy generation takes place throughout the entire country, but decisions 
concerning the application of fuels at means of generation and the application of these 
means are taken by the SEP, 
 
- that in the fight against acidity it is above all of importance to lower the total emission of 
acidifying components in the Netherlands, 
 
- that it therefore is suitable to make arrangements concerning the level of emissions of 
SO2 and NOx that the collective electricity generating companies should abide by, 
 
- that in setting the emissions ceiling for SO2 and NOx in the year 2000 at a level which is 
appreciably lower that the level that would be achieved were only the Decision 
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concerning the emission requirements for boilers Law concerning air pollution to be 
adhered to, the electricity generating companies are able to make an important 
contribution to the lowering of the emission of these materials in the Netherlands in the 
period to the year 2000, 
 
- that setting these emission ceilings gives SEP the possibility to reduce emissions within 
the Decision concerning the emission requirements for boilers Law concerning air 
pollution in a more cost-effective manner than would be possible if the same emission 
requirements were to be introduced at the same time for categories of installations, 
 
- that for the realisation of the objective outlined above it is necessary that the Parties 
involved make an arrangement, 
 
- that given the 1989-1998 Electricity Plan, the Note reconsidering the main features of 
energy policy, the Interim Evaluation Note on Acidity and the Plan to Combat Acidity 
 
 
Agree: I Definitions 
 
Article 1: interpretation 
 
In this covenant, the following definitions apply: 
 
1. The State: the State of the Netherlands and those of its organs enjoying legislative or 
administrative powers 
2. SEP: the public limited company, Co-operating Electricity Generation Companies N.V. 
3. Electricity generation company: EPZ N.V., EPON N.V., EZH N.V. and UNA N.V. 
4. The province: each of the provinces and those of their organs enjoying legislative of 
administrative powers 
5. the Law: the law concerning air pollution (Wet inzake de luchtverontreiniging Stb. 1981, 
411) 
6. the Decision: the Decision concerning the emission requirements for boilers Law 
concerning air pollution (Stb. 1987, 164) 
7. Licence: a license as understood in article 20, paragraph 1 of the Law. 
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II Objectives 
 
Article 2: emission ceilings 
 
The annual emission of sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) from the boilers of 
electricity generating companies in the Netherlands will be limited by the year 2000 at the latest 
to 18 million kg SO2 and 30 million kg NOx annually. 
 
Article 3: heat  
For the reduction of nitrogen oxide, which will be realised after the conclusion of the covenant, as 
a consequence of the heat supplied by the SEP in the context of the execution of the SEP heat 
plan, on the basis of 1250 Mew the emission target for NOx laid down in article 2 will be increased 
by at least 5 million kg. If it is ultimately contemplated that a unit will only supply useful heat for a 
part, the target will only be raised proportionately. 
 
Article 4: fault rules (modification scheme) 
1. The SO2 value laid down in article 2 will be increased by 4 million kg to offer scope for 
the emission of SO2 from coal centers when the flue gas desulphurisation installations 
are disturbed and the station remains in operation in conformity with the law. 
 
2. Where as a consequence of disturbances of flue gas deshulphurisation installations the 
So2 emissions exceed the corrected ceiling level, SEP will be permitted to exceed the 
corrected ceiling at the most once every three years by 3 million kg. 
 
 
III State Obligations 
 
Article 5: rules 
 
The Minister of Public Housing, Planning and Environmental Management shall, in the revision of 
the Decision concerning the emission requirements for boilers Law concerning air pollution 
announced in the Plan to combat acidity, which is required for the execution of that plan, take 
account of the arrangement made in the context of this covenant in the following manner: 
 
1 For existing boilers belonging to an electricity generating company the emission levels 
shall not be tightened. 
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2 For boilers belonging to an electricity generating company, other than those mentioned 
under 1, the emission levels will be altered as follows. 
a. coal-fired 
SO2: 200 mg/m3, where the license was granted after 1-1-1990; 
NOx: 400 mg/m3, where the license was granted before 1-1-1989; 
300 mg/m3, where the license was granted in 1989; 
200 mg/m3, where the license was granted on or after 1-1-1990; 
 
b. oil-fire 
SO2: 200 mg/m3, 
NOx: the same requirements shall be set as for equivalent installations in the industry 
 
c. gas-fired or gas turbine installations 
the same requirements shall be set as for equivalent installations in the industry. 
 
 
 
IV SEP Obligations 
 
Par. 1 Obligation to endeavour 
 
Article 6: Measures 
 
1. SEP and the electricity generation companies shall endeavour that the emission of SO2 
and NOx, taking a reasonable degree of cost effectiveness in to account, shall be limited 
as far as possible by, inter alia, 
a. at boilers where desulphurisation as understood in article 11 second paragraph or article 
15 second paragraph of the Decision is taking place, using low sulphur coal and 
optimising the output of the desulphurising, 
b. at boilers, for which a first license is granted after 1 January 1989 but before the signing 
of this contract, by taking such measures that at coal-fired boilers that as far as possible 
the levels approach the norm of 200 mg/m3, derived from flue gas with an oxygen level of 
6%. 
c. at boilers for which a first license is granted after the signing of this covenant, to take 
such measures that 
-by coal-fire boilers a maximum of 200 mg per m3 SO2 and a maximum of 200 mg per m3 
NOx is reached, derived from flue gas with an oxygen level of 6% 
 46
-by gas-fired boilers to keep the levels as low as possible, but a maximum of 100 mg NOx 
per m3 will be reached, derived from a flue gas with an oxygen level of 6%, and 
-by gas turbine installations a value will be reached of 65g/GJ, valid for normal dry flue 
gas. 
2. SEP shall ensure that in 1994 the emissions of SO2 do not exceed a maximum of 30 
million kg and the emissions of NOx 55 million kg. 
3. SEP shall as far as possible attempt to avoid disruptions in the provision of the flue gas 
de-sulphurisation. 
4. SEP undertakes to equip a Polish electricity company to provide a coal-fired unite in 
Poland with a flue gas desulphurising appliance. 
 
 
Par. 2  Plan of Action 
 
Article 7: time of establishment and content 
 
1 Within 6 months of the signing of this covenant, SEP will draw up a Plan of Action for 
carrying out the objectives for the period to the year 2000 mentioned in article 2, and 
shall submit it for examination by the Commission mentioned in article 14. 
2 The Plan of Action contains: 
a. a report of the boilers mentioned in article 2 to which this covenant is applicable. 
b. for each boiler for which measures are provided, in the interests of the execution of that 
laid down in article 15, the necessary information concerning the operative SO2 and NOx 
emissions standards pursuant to the Decision and – where they are stricter – also the 
demands imposed by the current license. 
c. for the remaining boilers, the total annual emissions level,  
d. a summary of the phasing-in of the reduction of emissions, the current measures to 
combat the emission of SO2 and NOx with the time scales for the anticipated introduction 
and the accompanying anticipated levels of emission. In the choice of means of reducing 
the emissions, a balanced regional division shall be aimed at. 
e. for each boiler for which one or more definitive measures have been laid down, the 
resulting emission levels being the values which shall be observed taking into account 
the applicable provisions concerning measurement, and the annual average anticipated 
values including emissions during periods of disruption. 
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Article 8: adaptation and alteration 
 
1 When the technical problems as understood in article 11 second paragraph, of such a 
nature that reasonable/grounded doubt exists at the SEP whether the emission ceilings, 
mentioned in article 2, can be met, it shall adjust the Plan of Action. 
2 For reasons of cost efficiency, SEP may alter the Plan of Action when it is of the opinion 
that new technical possibilities given it cause to do so. 
 
 
Par. 3 Execution of the Plan of Action 
 
Article 9: responsibility 
 
SEP is responsible for the realisation of the emission targets mentioned in article 2 and for the 
execution of the Plan of Action. 
 
 
Article 10: individual electricity generation companies 
 
1 The electricity generation companies shall include SO2 and NOx values, which according 
to article 7 paragraph e constitute part of the Plan of Action, in a communication as 
understood in article 17 of the License Decision for the Air Pollution Institutions 
(Vergunningsbesluit inrichting luchtverontreiniging), either in a request for a license or in 
a request for the alteration of a license. 
2 Every electricity generating company shall prior to 1 March each year report to SEP and 
the College of County Aldermen (College van Gedeputeerde Staten) which granted its 
license, about compliance with the norms contained in the Decision, and the License 
prescriptions relating to the emission of SO2 and NOx , as well as the actual emission 
SO2 and NOx from its boilers, given that which is contained in the Plan of Action 
understood in article 7 concerning this oven. 
3 Where the emissions from an boiler are continually monitored, SEP encourages that the 
individual masses of the daily emissions are set on the basis of the calculated output of 
flue gasses and shall be added to the quantities emitted in the preceding days of the 
calendar year. 
4 Where the daily emissions from an boiler are not monitored daily, SEP encourages that 
the mass of the SO2 and NOx emitted in a calendar year is calculated. 
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Article 11: report 
 
1. Every even year, SEP presents a report to the Commission mentioned in article 14 on 
the execution of the covenant, the Plan of Action and the plans for combatting emissions 
of SO2 and NOx in the remaining period to the year 2000. 
2. If in the report period technical problems have arisen, SEP shall mention these in its 
report. 
 
 
V  Obligations of the provinces 
 
Article 12: exercises of competence 
 
1 The province shall exercise its powers in relation to the fixing of emission norms for SO2 
and NOx in conformity with the provisions of this covenant and the Plan of Action. 
2 The province is not bound by the provisions contained in paragraph 1 where: 
a. an electricity generation company fails to execute that provided in article 10; 
b. it is necessary to take into account air quality demands, on the basis of 
article 2 of the Law, which have been set with other aims in mind than combatting 
acidity 
In these case, the province can set an ceiling for a boiler. 
 
Article 13: report 
 
The province sends a copy of the report mentioned in article 10 paragraph 2 to the regional 
inspector. 
 
VI The Commission 
 
Par. 1 Composition 
 
Article 14: The Commission 
 
1 There is a Commission, composed of six members, two of whom are appointed by the 
Minister of Public Housing, Planning and Environmental Management, two by the SEP 
and two by the provinces. 
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The Minister of Public Housing, Planning and Environmental Management shall appoint 
the chairman. 
2 The Minister of Economic Affairs can send an observer to the meetings of the 
Commission 
 
Par. 2  Evaluating and altering the Plan of Action 
 
Article 15: evaluation criteria 
 
The Commission approves the Plan of Action if it is not in conflict with the emission ceilings set in 
article 2, the obligations enumerated in article 6, the Decision or the prescriptions concerning 
emission of SO2 and NOx which are contained in licenses granted under the Law. 
 
Article 16: deviation from the Plan of Action 
 
1 Where the Commission reaches the opinion that the Plan of Action in conflict with one or 
more of the criteria mentioned in article 15, it shall inform SEP of this and of the reasons 
which lead to this conclusion. 
2 If SEP agrees with the opinion of the Commission, it shall adjust the Plan of Action and 
submit it once again for the Commission’s approval. 
3 If SEP rejects the Commission’s opinion, after the Commission has informed the Parties 
of its findings, it shall consult with other Parties to provide for the situation which has 
arisen. 
 
Article 17: alteration of the Plan of Action 
 
Articles 15 and 16 are correspondingly applicable where the Plan of Action is changed after the 
Commission has approved the Plan of Action. 
 
Par. 3  Advice 
 
Article 18: Granting advice 
 
1. The Commission can advise about all which, pursuant to the execution of the covenant, 
can be included in an application for or amendment of a license or in a statement in 
relation to the emission of SO2 and NOx. 
 50
2. The Commission ca deliver advice to the province concerning that which, pursuant to the 
execution of this covenant, can be included in license provisions concerning emission of 
SO2 and NOx . 
 
Par. 4  Evaluating the report 
 
Article 19: Evaluation criteria 
 
The Commission evaluates the report mentioned in article 11 on the basis of the Plan of Action. It 
checks whether the execution of the measures is going according to the plan and if the 
attainment of the objectives laid in article 2 is reasonably possible. 
 
VII  Amendment and termination 
 
Article 20: amendment 
 
1 Where unexpected, substantial environmental developments take place caused by the 
emission of SO2 and NOx the Parties shall consult to assess to what extent the covenant 
is need of adjustment. 
2 In that consultation, the technical developments which have occurred will also be taken 
into consideration. 
3 The ceilings mentioned in article 2 shall be altered where the import or demand for 
electricity for which the SEP and the electricity generation companies must provide, 
diverges substantially from the planning in the 1989-1998 Electricity Plan. The alteration 
shall take place on the basis of the level of technology at that moment and the choice of 
fuel input. 
 
Article 21: termination 
 
Where the consultation mentioned in article 16 paragraph 3 or the consultation mentioned in 
article 20 paragraphs 1 and 3 does not lead to agreement, or where it emerges from a report 
mentioned in article 11 that it seems likely that the emission levels shall not be met, the Parties 
can terminate the covenant. 
 
VIII  Miscellaneous 
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Article 22: evaluation and continuation 
 
1 The Parties agree to evaluate the execution of this covenant in 1994 and 1998. 
2 The Parties agree that after the evaluations of 1994 and 1998, arrangements shall be 
made concerning measures to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions after the year 2000 by 
supplementing or altering this covenant. In so doing, account will be taken of the 
(scientific) developments concerning knowledge about the causes of acidity and the 
techniques to fight it, the contributions made to the reduction of acidifying emissions 
made by other target groups in the Netherlands and the reduction of emissions achieved 
abroad. 
 
Article 23: environmental care 
 
1 SEP is prepared to set up environmental care systems with the individual electricity 
generators, which safeguard good environmental management by the electricity 
generation companies, including the compliance with provisions to protect the 
environment laid down by or by virtue of the law, and the reporting of it. 
2 The description of the environmental care system for SO2 and NOx shall be annexed to 
the Plan of Action as understood in article 7. 
3 The system shall be extended to other environmental matters as soon as possible. 
 
Agreed and signed in triplicate in the The Hague on Tuesday, 12 June 1990. 
Ir. N.G. Ketting     C.J. Korver     J.G.M. Alders 
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